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Parents with Mental Disabilities: The Legal Landscape
Dale Margolin Cecka, JD
“It is better for all the world, if . . . society can 
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind. . . . Three generations of 
imbeciles are enough.” (Justice Holmes, Buck v. 
Bell, 1927)
In the first part of the twentieth century, 
individuals with mental disabilities were 
sterilized by institutions to prevent them from 
having offspring (Dowdney & Skuse, 1993). 
Although we have abandoned this as public 
policy, parents with mental disabilities still 
lose custody of their children at much higher 
rates than their non-disabled peers (National 
Technical Assistance for State Mental Health 
Planning, 2000). 
The Americans with  
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
The ADA was enacted in 1990 to remedy 
discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities (ADA, 2006). Over 54 million 
Americans are protected under the ADA 
(Office on Disability, 2005). Title II of the 
ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
disability by a public entity, which includes 
(1) any state or local government, and (2) 
any department, agency, special purpose 
district, or other instrumentality of a state or 
states or local government. According to its 
regulations, the ADA applies to “all services, 
programs, and activities provided or made 
available by public entities.” 
The ADA requires that “a public 
entity ... make reasonable modifications 
in policies, practices, or procedures when 
the modifications are necessary to avoid 
discrimination on the basis of disability.” Title 
II of the ADA does not require public entities 
to make “fundamental alterations” to the 
nature of their programs or services. 
A state’s department of social services 
is a public entity and when it initiates 
a termination of parental rights (TPR) 
proceeding, it should be considered state 
activity. Reunification and family preservation 
services should also be considered services, 
programs, or activities which may need to 
be “reasonably modified” in order for states 
to provide equal access to parents with 
disabilities. 
Federal and state courts, however, have 
consistently held that the ADA does not 
apply to parents facing TPRs. The reasons 
include: (1) TPR proceedings are not a 
“service, program or activity” within the 
meaning of the ADA (see In re Adoption of 
Gregory, 2001; In the Matter of Terry, 2000; 
In re Antony B, 1999; In the Interest of B. K. 
F., 1997; and In re B. S., 1997); (2) a juvenile 
court’s jurisdiction cannot interpret a federal 
law or conduct “an open-ended inquiry into 
how the parents might respond to alternative 
services and why those services have not 
been provided” (see In re B. S., 1997; In 
the Interest of Torrance P., 1994; and In re 
Maryia R., 1997); and (3) Title II provides 
plaintiffs with a private right of action against 
a public entity but cannot be used as a legal 
defense (In re Doe, 2002; In the Matter of 
Rodriguez, 1999).
A handful of courts have allowed the 
ADA to be a defense to a TPR (see In the 
Matter of John D., 1997), some without 
specifically ruling on its applicability (e.g. 
In the Matter of J. B., 1996; In re Caresse B., 
1997; In the Interest of C. C., 1995; In re 
Dependency of C. C., 1999; J. T. v. Arkansas 
Department of Human Services, 1997; In 
re Karrlo K., 1994; and In the Matter of K. 
D. W., 1994). Still, those courts have ruled 
that sufficient reasonable modifications in 
family preservation services were made to 
accommodate individuals’ mental disabilities, 
and therefore no ADA violations occurred. 
One exception was In the Interest of K. K. 
W. (1995), where the courts found that 
the state violated the ADA by failing to 
modify its reunification services to assure 
equally effective services to a parent with 
schizophrenia: the state provided only services 
that are offered to parents without disabilities. 
According to a few courts, the ADA can 
be raised in child welfare proceedings but only 
prior to a TPR proceeding. In the interest of S. 
State child welfare laws require reasonable efforts in order to comply 
with the [Adoption and Safe Families Act]. ...The state laws also do not 
specifically require the reasonable efforts to be tailored to meet the needs 
of parents with disabilities.   
O
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L. P (1999) held that the issues of adequate 
services and reasonable accommodations for 
parents with disabilities need to be addressed 
at review hearings or when they are offered, 
and that it is too late to challenge the service 
plan at the TPR proceeding. (See also In the 
Matter of Terry, 2000; In the Interest of A. M., 
1999; Stone v. Daviess, 1995; In re Antony B., 
1999; In re B. S., 1997; In re M. J. M., 2002; 
and In the Matter of Terry, 2000). But at least 
one court has held that the ADA may not be 
raised in dependency proceedings either: In 
M. C. v. Department of Children & Families 
(2000), the court found that dependency 
proceedings are held for the benefit of the 
child, not the parent, and therefore the 
ADA may not be used as a defense in such 
proceedings. 
Thus far, courts that find the ADA 
applicable to child welfare cases usually do not 
hold agencies accountable for offering unique 
services to parents with mental disabilities 
(see In the Matter of Terry, 2000; In the Matter 
of the Welfare of H. S., 1999; In re Caresse B., 
1997; and Bartley v. State, 1996). Courts seem 
to have made the assumption that this would 
fundamentally alter a state’s child welfare 
program, presumably because of financial or 
other burdens. However, advocates for parents 
can counter this argument (Margolin, 2007). 
Many alternative services actually save the 
state money in the long run. The question 
of an undue financial burden is a fact-
specific inquiry; under the ADA, there is no 
justification for a total absence of services that 
actually help parents with mental disabilities. 
Parents with disabilities are entitled to services 
that have the same potential, with or without 
reasonable modification, for facilitating 
reunification as parents without disabilities. 
The Adoption and Safe Families 
Act (ASFA) & “Reasonable Efforts” 
Requirements Under State Law
In addition to the ADA’s reasonable 
modification requirement, the federal 
Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) 
requires states to make “reasonable efforts” 
to preserve and reunify families in order to 
prevent or eliminate the removal of a child 
(ASFA, 1997). State child welfare laws require 
reasonable efforts in order to comply with 
ASFA. ASFA does not provide a private 
right of action for parents to enforce these 
“reasonable efforts” laws (Suter v. Artist M., 
1992). The state laws also do not specifically 
require the reasonable efforts to be tailored 
to meet the needs of parents with disabilities. 
Arkansas is the only exception: its statute 
does require the state to make reasonable 
accommodations in accordance with the ADA 
to parents with disabilities (Ark Code Ann. 
§ 9-27-341). Advocates can attempt to argue 
that services are not “reasonable” if they do 
SSW AD coming
not take into account a parent’s disability. 
However, most courts, including most cited 
in this article, “rubber stamp” reasonable 
efforts even when they appear to be ill-suited 
to a particular parent. 
There have been some exceptions (see 
In re Adoption/Guardianship, 2002; Mary 
Ellen C. v. Arizona Department of Economic 
Security, 1999; In re the Dependency of H. 
W. & V. W., 1998; and In re Victoria M., 
1989). These courts have examined whether 
the “reasonable efforts” were appropriate to 
the needs of parents with disabilities. The 
decisions also required child welfare agencies 
to work with the developmental disabilities 
or mental health service system. In In re P. A. 
B. (1990), the court reversed a termination 
order because the bond between parents with 
mental disabilities and their children had 
not been considered by the trial court before 
terminating rights. In Division of Family 
Services v. Murphy (2000), the court allowed 
two parents with mental disabilities to regain 
custody of their children because, by working 
together, they could adequately address the 
needs of their children. The court also noted 
that even though parents might require 
agency assistance from time to time, their 
children should not be placed in foster care.
Some appeals courts have also reversed 
TPRs where courts made decisions based 
on stereotypes about individuals with 
disabilities. For example, In re C. W. (2007) 
found that the trial court inappropriately 
relied on an outdated psychiatric assessment 
when terminating a mother’s rights. Without 
expert testimony about the mother’s current 
mental health status or the child’s needs, the 
court’s decision emanated from assumptions 
and speculation. (See also In re Adoption/
Guardianship, 2002.) 
Conclusion
The ADA, coupled with federal and state 
child welfare laws, provides broad brush 
strokes for advocates of parents with mental 
disabilities and their children. To effectuate 
parents’ rights, child welfare professionals 
must work with the parents themselves, as 
well as with other state departments, to form 
service plans that are tailored for the success 
of each individual family.
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